AMBASSADOR RABINOVICH: Thank you very much, Mr. Hickman, for a very generous introduction. Thank you also for your credit extended last week. And it's an excellent opportunity to apologize to those of you who wanted to be here last week. It was not just the expectation of momentous developments, but physically I found out on Thursday that I would be in California on Friday and conceivably could not have been here as well. So the fact that I'm here on this Friday is not necessarily portentous of any news good or bad.

I would like to be comparatively brief in my opening remarks and leave as much time as we can for our discussion.

Clearly, news and developments are dominated by the breakthrough that we have had with the Palestinians. The breakthrough was presented to Secretary of State Christopher in the form of an initialed agreement or initialed declaration of principle which is inclusive of an agreement. What had been initialed in Oslo was approved by our Cabinet; has yet to be approved by whatever Palestinian institutions will have to be gathered in order to approve it; and is now being discussed in the context of a wider Israeli- Palestinian agreement on which we are working.

We are trying to effect a second stage of this agreement with a view to enabling Israel and the PLO to go through formal recognition so as to enable political figures from the Palestinian political community, or a political figure, to sign here in Washington -- or offer a formal signing to this agreement.

This is the technical side of things. There is, of course, a qualitative edge. From our point of view, if the conditions that we present or we have presented to the PLO in order to enable, make possible from our side recognition and formal signing are met, this would mean two things; one would be that the PLO will have undergone the metamorphosis, the sea change that we have required for a long time in order to be able to deal with the PLO. And perhaps more significantly, it would signify acceptance of Israel as a state, as a legitimate Jewish state in the region by the formal representatives of the Palestinian national movement.

And since it has been argued for many years now that this conflict, the specific Israeli-Palestinian national dispute, is at the core of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict, it could mean that the core issue of the conflict would have been very seriously ameliorated, if not fully resolved. This would be a momentous development.

Now, if this happens, we would like to -- then to proceed along two tracks; one is here in Washington, along the other three tracks of the bilateral Arab- Israeli negotiations. We have Syria, Jordan and Lebanon with whom we have been negotiating this week as well. We have these tracks on which we also hope to reach agreements, and we trust that the fact that we have reached an agreement with the Palestinians, possibly to be buttressed by an even larger agreement with the Palestinians, should facilitate progress on the other tracks. Secondly, we would like to proceed with the broader process of reconciliation between Israelis and Arabs. We have been speaking here in Washington during the past few months of a mindset of peace, a mindset of peace establishing a foothold in the region. We've looked at the multilateral peace negotiations; we've looked at the fact that they are now going to be held in Arab countries; we've looked at the first invitation to an Israeli member of the Cabinet to a regional conference in an Arab country; we have looked at King Fahd's speech to the Muslim pilgrims; we have looked at the abrogation of the secondary and tertiary boycott by Kuwait as signalling, on the Arab side, progress towards a normalization of Arab-Israeli relations that is related to the formal peace process but goes beyond it; and, of course, there are the signs in Israel and what has been accomplished some two weeks ago could not have happened but for this mindset of peace having established a foothold. And we therefore hope that continued progress along the Israeli- Palestinian track will contribute in these two ways.

If we are to judge by what we have seen this week in the negotiations that I personally participate in, that is to say the negotiations with the Syrians, then we could be encouraged. We have not been able to overcome the basic problem in these negotiations.

Those of you who are veterans of the State Department stakeout -- and I do see some of you here -- I think know the text of the draft declaration of principles that the Syrians and us have been working on for almost -- for a year now, I can say, know it almost by heart and we speak by codes: "What about 5(a) this week?" And so forth. Well, 5(a), 5(b) have not been resolved; that is to say articles dealing with withdrawal and with peace.

But the first four paragraphs of these paragraphs are now almost in full agreement between the Syrians and us. Several of the sticking points of previous rounds have been resolved this week. This is important. It's not the key issue, but these are important issues, and I'm delighted that in this week, when everybody is in a holding pattern, is in a mood of trying to anticipate what happens and then move accordingly, that both the Syrians and us found the presence of mind and the courage needed in order to make progress, albeit limited.

A final word about the economic dimension of Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking. I've been on a television show this morning, and -- together with the Egyptian ambassador to Washington, which was an interesting occasion in itself -- two graduates of the Camp David process speaking with some perspective on what is happening now. But a question was presented to my Egyptian colleague on the economic package that might be attached and how expensive it should be for the American taxpayer, and the question had an edge: Will the Arabs mobilize resources? And I wanted to emphasize very emphatically that there is no economic tail to this that will be directed towards the United States.

Some European countries have already volunteered to offer aid to buttress economically the Palestinian self-governing authority that is envisaged and I trust will be established very soon. We hope that the Japanese will move on, and of course, this is not something that we can arrange, but we very much hope that those Arab countries that have the resources will participate as well. But it is not a bill to be presented to the United States. The United States and the US government, the administration, have been very helpful in this process all along, and specifically so since last Friday, when they were presented with the agreement, liked what they saw, endorsed it and have been very effective in helping to see it through during the past week. But this political support is sufficient, is impressive, and we are not looking at any economic burden. Thank you very much.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, the next step --

Q: Excuse me. Barry Schweid of AP. The next step everybody seems to be waiting for is the usual recognition involving a revision of the covenant. As I understood it, the PLO never was on record as calling for Israel's destruction but, more carefully, calling for the dismantling of Israel as a Jewish state. You just spoke -- and maybe you were just speaking off the cuff in that sense -- of the PLO recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. Are you saying that this process, as you understand it, will involve the PLO declaring Israel exists as a Jewish state?

AMB. RABINOVICH: No. I -- since I'm not personally involved in the negotiations that are unfolding now, I wouldn't want to elaborate on the specifics, and I wouldn't want to tell you specifically that the word -- or that the couple of words "Jewish state" do appear in the text.

But what is at stake from our point of view and what we seek to make clear and explicit, leaving no room for any ambiguity, is that this is not just a question of accepting a state called Israel in the Middle East, but it's accepting the state of Israel as it is. And what it is is the Jewish national state.

Q: But that may not be put explicitly. That'll be your interpretation of what's happening.

AMB. RABINOVICH: Well, I -- the whole point about these negotiations is that they are not meant to leave any loopholes for interpretations. And the reason that they have not been completed is that we do want everything to be explicit and clear beyond any dispute.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, could you tell us a little bit about the --

Q: Sid (Bowman ?), UPI. About the agreements you have been able to reach with Syria this week? The first four paragraphs. And also, has the United States firmed up its pledge to offer security guarantees along the Golan?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Okay. Before I am answering, I just noticed in the audience my colleague, Professor Rusla Pidot (sp), from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who has worked also with the Foreign Ministry and has invested a lot of her talent and time in formulating some of our basic documents and I hope will be called upon to contribute to this process as well.

Now, for your -- in response to your questions. I wouldn't call what we have reached with the Syrians this week agreements. We have been working -- technically speaking, the form of negotiation with the Syrians that we have had since the Syrians presented and we accepted their draft a year ago was to try and reach a common text. And through working on a common text, all aspects of the negotiations can be addressed. It's, of course, a form of negotiation, a form of bargaining, also a form of mutual education.

I was called a Syria expert before, but I now realize my limitations as of a year ago, because I've certainly learned a lot about Syrian politics and about the way a Syrian thinks about politics and clearly about us and the Arab- Israeli conflict. And every word, of course, has a baggage and almost every word is a code word and, therefore, changing even a single word in that text is an opus.

But -- and some of these sticking points that have been there for a year were removed this year. They concerned the relationship between comprehensiveness and bilateral agreements. And I can say that there was at least a dimension of irony to the fact that the Syrians have negotiated with us with regard to comprehensiveness for a year on the assumption that they were going to be first and they would have to worry about the Palestinians. And the way we have looked at comprehensiveness this week was somewhat different.

So, it's comprehensiveness versus the bilateral agreement, it's -- or as distinct from bilateral agreements. Secondly, it's a question of defining what this peace process is all about. And, thirdly and most significantly, the paragraph concerning security. For us -- this is called a peace process, but for us Israelis, it really is a peace and security process. And what we obtain by way of security is hardly less important than what we obtain by peace.

There are divergent perspectives between the Syrians and us with regard to security, we have not fully closed the gap, but this week we narrowed it very significantly.

Q: (Off mike) -- United States security guarantees?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yeah, this has been mentioned several times by the president and by the secretary, sort of floated in the air as an element inspiring the negotiations but has not been taken up formally or into the negotiations yet, and this is the way things remain.

Q: (Name inaudible) -- freelance. Question on recognition. You mentioned that the exchange of recognitions would involve Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel. Is the reverse of that true? That the agreement would involve Israeli recognition of the state of Palestine or recognition of what? And a subsidiary question -- I suppose recognition would involve an exchange of ambassadors -- a Palestinian ambassador coming to Israel. Where would an Israel ambassador go -- to Tunis, Jericho, to Gaza? (Laughter.) And a brief question, was the agreement published in the New York Times authentic and authoritative? AMB. RABINOVICH: Okay, it's again somewhat ironic that the author of the most successful textbook on Middle East -- modern history of the Middle East would present himself as freelance -- (laughter) -- but this is the Dan Berris (ph) I know.

Now, as I said earlier in response to another question, to Mr. Schweid's question, I -- I'm not really all that well versed in the minor details of the negotiations going on now, and I cannot tell you what exactly we will recognize, but I can tell you with certainty that it won't be a Palestinian state. We -- if we go through mutual recognition, it would be the state of Israel recognizing the organization, the PLO, as representing or speaking in the name the Palestinian national movement, but it won't be recognizing a state.

We -- the agreement we signed is an agreement on interim arrangements, and negotiations for final status will begin during the third year of this interim period. We all know that the Palestinians will press a claim for statehood, but this is to be negotiated and decided at a later time. And therefore, the question of ambassadorial representation and the locales (?) of that representation is of course is quite meaningless.

Q: The New York Times?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Oh, yeah, sorry. About the text -- well, this is an ambassador's dilemma. How can I formally say that what was informally leaked is precise -- (laughter) -- but I've read the text that was originally published in the Israeli newspaper, Yediot Aharonot, with great interest, and it reminded me very much of text I had read earlier elsewhere -- (laughter) -- and I must say that since it was a Hebrew version of something that was originally written in English, and the New York Times and others translated it back from Hebrew into English, some poetic license may have occurred, but I think one could benefit by reading that text.

Q: Ambassador, good morning. I am Scott -- (name inaudible) -- shalom. I would ask you if you could possibly take off your diplomatic hat for a moment and put your realistic hat on.

Anwar Sadat gave his life after the Camp David process. There were strong indications this morning that the PLO may not recognize the new agreement. There are still terrorist attacks coming into northern Israel from southern Lebanon. Hafiz al-Asad from Syria is still intransigent. What has changed? What gives you this feeling of optimism? Things seem to be the same way they've been for the past 45 years, with rare exceptions, okay?

AMB. RABINOVICH: I was afraid for a moment that you were asking me to put [on] my other hat, the academic one, but you merely wanted me to be realistic. That's fine. (Laughter.)

Let me begin by saying that Anwar Sadat was not killed because he made peace with Israel. Anwar Sadat was killed by Muslim militants in Egypt because they thought he was an enemy of Islam, and I think some of what you have seen in recent months in this country is possibly related to that and, I think, gives you an idea of what the issue was. Of course, the fact that he made peace with Israel did not endear him to the Muslim militants, but basically he was killed because they regarded him as a pagan, anti-Islamic ruler, and his killer in court shouted "I killed a wicked fellow." That was the most illustrative statement of what was on their mind.

But in any event, much has changed, certainly in the last 45 years or in the last 26 years since the end of the Six Day War, and even in the past three years since the convening of the Madrid conference. We would not have been speaking two years ago about Syria and Israel being close to drafting a joint declaration of principles on Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Yes, not everybody is for the agreement on the Arab side, and yes, I think Arafat's life is in danger, as are the lives of many other political leaders and activists in the Middle East, but the reaction is much more muted than it would have been in the past. And I could go on and on, and as I spoke earlier about what I call "the mindset of peace" and mention some of the indications of that change of mood in the Arab world, we are in an entirely different period formulated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, by the Gulf war, and perhaps more importantly, by the peace process itself.

The peace process is a process that is not static, is dynamic. The peace process is a dialogue between the process and the environment. The process is affected by the environment, but it also reshapes the environment.

Q: Mohammed Ouabi (sp), -- (affiliation inaudible). Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Peres this morning said that the agreement could be implemented even without the mutual recognition taking place. Now, to whom are you going to deliver Jericho and Gaza if this mutual recognition doesn't take place soon? To which power do you --

AMB. RABINOVICH: Right. Let me address it two different issues. We have -- an agreement was initialed in Oslo, and it can be implemented. It's self- sustaining, or, to borrow a phrase from another context, it stands on its own two feet. And it can be signed and it can be implemented. It is not our preference to do it. We think that having gone the distance, we would rather wait a few more days and find out whether we can go even further and achieve the qualitative leap that I have referred to in my opening statement. So that is our preference. But should that preference not materialize, prove not feasible, and that within a certain period of time it would turn out the this could not happen, then we can sign that agreement, and there are forces, there are elements in Palestinian society who can implement the agreement in Gaza and Jericho.

Now, let me also say implementing it in Gaza and Jericho is not our interest. This is something that we make feasible. It's in the interests of the Palestinians to be in a position to implement it. So we are there to live up to our commitments. We do not have to chaperone our partner into actually implementing it.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, Norm Kempster of The Los Angeles Times. I'd like to ask you to elaborate on a couple of things that you've said this morning which I'm not entirely sure I understood what it meant. The first one was that you said there would be no burden to the American taxpayer. Are you saying that the United States will not contribute anything to the fund for government in the West Bank? Because the secretary of state has indicated the United States will contribute something, although not much, and will try to raise money from other sources. The other thing that you said which I found interesting was Arafat's life is in danger. Can you tell us whether you think his life is more in danger now than it was a week ago or whether it's always been somewhat in danger? And does Israel have any interest in making sure that Arafat survives the next couple of years?

AMB. RABINOVICH: The first question is -- I think we are speaking of the same thing. If we look at relatively minor US economic aid possibly coming from existing budgets, then we are not looking at the burden on the US taxpayer. So I don't think that there's a difference between your information and mine on this.

With regard to Arafat's life, he has been threatened by members of what we call the fronts, these -- a working title differentiating the mainstream of the PLO from radical groups like the Democratic Front, Popular Front and so forth. He's been explicitly threatened by them. I'm really not an expert on the comparative security of Yassir Arafat, but -- and I couldn't tell you whether he's more in danger this week than he had been two weeks ago. Nor I think do we want to meddle in Palestinian politics and life to the extent that have been implied in your second question. I think that the agreement is about implementing self-rule, and self-rule is also about creating some distance and some separation between us and the Palestinians. And we certainly are not interested in being intimately involved in meddling in Palestinian affairs.

Q: Ralph Begleiter with CNN. Mr. Ambassador, if I could ask you to turn back to the Syrian negotiations, the second phase. Prime Minister Rabin is already under a great deal of pressure from various factions within Israel about the agreement with the Palestinians. Would he be able to withstand -- in your view, does the political situation in Israel right now enable him to withstand the possible agreement on the Golan Heights as well? And are you holding that out as a possibility for it occurring in a relatively short period of time after this -- on the heels of this on? Do both of those things overload the political system in Israel?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Well, Ralph, we are looking at the very complicated act of juggling. That is to say, we first need to know what the agreement is going to be like. If we had known what the shape of the agreement would be, we -- it would be easier. But we are still bargaining and haggling over the nature of the agreement, and therefore, the political marketing of the agreement in Israel would depend on what exactly it is that we are able to extract from these negotiations. And, therefore, we'll have to take it in stages. We'll have to establish a firm impression so that we would be in a position to tell the prime minister what exactly it is that we might be able to conclude.

Secondly, we'll have to make a judgment on the timing. And then we'll have -- I mean, he will have to make the political judgment on what it would mean in the Israeli arena and instruct us accordingly. That all needs to happen, but we are not on the verge of these developments. I've indicated some progress with the Syrians. I hope that we'll continue in the same vein, but we are not on the verge of concluding that agreement.

Q: Yes. (Inaudible.) I have two questions in one. First, what's new in Arab- Israeli relations that led to this major breakthrough? Second, what do you expect in the future? What are the prospects? Is this just another formal treaty, agreement, between Israel and the neighbors? Or do you expect an Israeli integration in the Middle East?

AMB. RABINOVICH: An Israeli --?

Q: Integration.

AMB. RABINOVICH: Ah, integration. Right.

Q: Do you expect Israeli integration in the region?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Right.

With regard to the first question, we have touched on some aspects of the answer to this question earlier. I think that what happened is the cumulative effect of the two years of the peace process, of the far-reaching changes in the international arena since the late '80s; for instance, from a Syrian point of view, the change began in 1987 when they were told by the Soviets that what had been traditional Soviet policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict had to change. If you remember, during a luncheon in the Kremlin, Mr. Gorbachev stood up in front -- in the presence of Hafiz al-Asad and announced that it was unnatural for the Soviet Union not to have relations with Israel. Hafiz al- Asad understood at that moment that something very major had happened, and his quest for a dialogue with the United States and, subsequently, his willingness to enter a peace process with Israel began actually at -- this is when the clock began to tick.

And also, I think that after 40-odd years of conflict there is fatigue in the region, certainly a general will to put an end to the conflict. Now, putting an end -- this will or fatigue do not necessarily translate to a political acceptance of the other side, and this is why we have needed two years of a peace process and we need to go on working towards that end.

Second question -- the meaning of the agreement. It really depends on whether we stay with phase one or are also successful in accomplishing phase two. If we stay with phase one it would mean that an Israeli-Palestinian agreement has been reached, that a very important obstacle has been removed, that life in the West Bank and Gaza and in Israel could be improved, and that a positive impact on the rest of the Arab-Israeli peace process should flow. If we are successful with phase two, it would have a much more resonant effect on our quest for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Now, Israeli integration in the region could mean two things. If it means that Israel politically becomes part of the system of states in the region, interacts with other states in the region, then I think yes, and in a very positive spirit. What we have seen recently of our joint efforts with Egypt to promote the peace process vindicate Sadat's claim at the time that he was not running away from the Arab consensus, he was just leading the Arab consensus and would help bring the others on board.

If integration means that Arabs will demand, as they have sometimes in the past, that Israel transform itself, shed some of its Jewish character in order to become yet another bland feature of the region, then we would be very much against it and this would not be the case. Political integration, yes, while keeping the distinctive character of the Israeli state and Israeli society.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, Gary Lane (sp), CBN News. You can talk autonomy and Gaza and Jericho and maybe even eventually reach an agreement on Golan, but it will still come around also to Jerusalem and the status of Jerusalem. To what extent is Jerusalem being discussed in the peace talks, and how large of an obstacle do you see that to an overall peace in the Middle East?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Well, a very important feature of the Israeli- Palestinian agreement that has been signed is that the issue of Jerusalem is shelved for these negotiations until the beginning of final status negotiations in the third year, which we regard as an important Israeli achievement in the negotiations which Arafat's critics in the Arab world use in order to prick him and to try to embarrass him, which also leads to some rhetoric on his own part that doesn't sit very well with the facts of the agreement.

Now, I wouldn't want to delude myself that the issue of Jerusalem as an issue, as a live issue, could be shelved. Jerusalem, first of all, is a live and functioning city. It's a point of contact and interaction between Israelis and Arabs, and life in Jerusalem will continue and the need to (form ?) coexistence and to think about future life in Jerusalem will continue.

But the precise answer to your specific question is that in terms of the agreement, the issue of -- the Palestinians can raise the issue of Jerusalem as of the beginning of the third year of interim self- government.

Q: How large of an obstacle do you see it, Mr. Ambassador, to an overall peace?

AMB. RABINOVICH: I wouldn't begin by defining Jerusalem as an obstacle. You know, I think that without getting into municipal election propaganda in Jerusalem, I think that Teddy Kollek has done an amazing piece of work in keeping Jerusalem functioning and making Jerusalem a success story for so many years. And it could turn into a showcase. It doesn't necessarily have to be an obstacle. To the point that two national wills will focus on the city of Jerusalem or two religious quests will focus on the city of Jerusalem, it could be an obstacle and a significant one. I wouldn't want to belittle the significance of that potential aspect.

Q: (Inaudible) -- Mason, BBC World Service. Mr. Ambassador, just to come back to the relationship between the various documents, the first point, you say that the autonomy agreement is self-standing, can be -- and I think Mr. Peres has said it can be signed on its own. The Palestinian delegates here in Washington are saying that they're not going to sign it because they didn't negotiate it; it's got to be signed by the PLO. So, isn't it really absolutely dependent on the mutual recognition agreement? And the other point is, with regard to the other tracks, do you think it's going to be necessary to have simultaneous signing of agreements, documents, with all the other parties at the same time?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Okay. To begin with the second question, the answer is no. The Syrian definition -- remember, the Syrians were the hard-liners on comprehensiveness -- was that -- which was given in an interview by President Asad to a colleague of yours in the British journalistic world, Patrick Seale (sp), a few months ago, said that there are four tracks. We are negotiating - - we, Israelis and Arabs, are negotiating bilateral agreements on these four tracks. And as long as they all fall within our heritage, as he put it, that is to say the Arab national heritage, these four different tracks can proceed in a parallel way and not necessarily simultaneous. So, that remains the case. With regard to the first point, as -- technically, legally, the agreement stands on its own and can be signed.

There is a political and a practical question of producing by the Palestinians of the Palestinian delegational group or person who would sign it on behalf of the Palestinians, which is a Palestinian issue. I very much hope that we won't find at the end of the day that the Palestinian political community has been able to sign this agreement and finds it difficult to actually fully sign it. I trust that this won't be the case. We'll know more about it next week.

Q: Yes. Hamdi Fouad, Al Ahram newspaper. Mr. Ambassador, do you expect that your foreign minister will be coming soon to Washington, and can we expect that there will be a big ceremony at the White House and State Department when this agreement is going to be signed? And when do you expect the end of this round of talks?

AMB. RABINOVICH: The foreign minister, Mr. Peres, is scheduled to come to this country and to Washington before the end of this month anyway. Should the present negotiations conclude successfully and should a decision be made that the signing off will be by cabinet level or political level personalities, he may very well. It's not a certainty, but certainly it's a possibility that the foreign minister will come in that event. And in any event, this round of negotiations is to conclude before the 14th of this month. We have the Jewish new year, and our delegations need to be home in time for the holidays. So it's been convened originally as a comparatively brief session.

Q: (Name off mike) -- writer for Jewish newspapers. There are dozens of questions, of course, but let me confine myself to just two. One, just what is the West Bank, which is written into the agreement twice? Is it Judea and Samaria, as it is known, or some other line? Is it the line that Prime Minister Rabin drew to hold off the gunmen from the territories coming into properly -- perhaps it's known as proper Israel, or what. And the second question that comes up --

AMB. RABINOVICH: I know this terminology can be confusing, and there is maybe an apocryphal story about a foreign dignitary who made the package seven-day tour to Israel for the first time and was briefed on all our national problems and on the way out to Ben Gurion airport was asked "Well, sir, how do you sum up your situation?" And he looked at the corps of the Israeli press and said "I think you can keep Judea and Samaria, but you will certainly have to give back the West Bank." (Laughter.)

But for all intents and purposes, they mean the same thing. The West Bank is the technical, non-political name for the areas that -- Israelis or people who want to invoke the biblical claim, they call it Judea and Samaria.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, you didn't answer the question about the Rabin line. Is that the line?

AMB. RABINOVICH: What?

Q: When Prime Minister Rabin set the line as to where the Arabs from the territories can enter Israel --

AMB. RABINOVICH: Ah, yeah.

Q: Just where is that?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Oh, the line was what we call "the green line". That is the line of 4 June '67 separating the West Bank and Gaza from Israel proper. But that particular line is not all that relevant for what we are discussing now because there is not going to be, for instance, self-rule in all of the West Bank because significant parts of the West Bank where you have Jewish settlements or roads and so forth are not going to be part of the autonomy. So in terms of your question, that line not relevant.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, Jeff -- (name and affiliation inaudible). Just a quick question about Syria. How is -- (inaudible) -- Syrian weapons procurement in support for terrorist organizations -- (inaudible)?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yes, we are still -- let me put it this way. You know, there has been a -- sometimes a simpleminded formula that describes the negotiations between Israel and Syria as focusing on a question of how much peace is Syria going to give to Israel, and how much territory is Israel going to give to Syria. And it's really more complex than that. And we are asking ourselves and the Syrians other questions. We also want to know about security, wanted to know about the relationship between the Syrian track and comprehensive settlement.

We also want to see an unequivocal Syrian commitment to peacemaking, and support for terrorist organizations' behavior in Lebanon, and procuring the latest weapons systems raise question marks in our mind, and these are some of the questions and indications to which we will need answers before we make up our minds and decide on what it is that we are willing to offer the Syrians.

AMB. RABINOVICH: Thank you very much.