AMBASSADOR RABINOVICH: Thank you for coming to the Embassy of Israel on this difficult day. Let me begin with two items of news. The government of Israel concluded, a few minutes ago, a special lengthy session, which was held at the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv. Perhaps the location was not accidental. Security is uppermost in everybody's mind in Israel today. It made a series of decisions and passed a series of resolutions that will embody the determination to conduct an all-out effective counter-campaign against the terrorist campaign, which has been waged against the state of Israel and the citizens of the state of Israel in recent days.

Later in the day, we will be able to share with you some additional details concerning the government's session. But the principal decision that I can share with you now concerns a resolution on the establishment of a special staff headed by the new director the General Security Service, to coordinate and wage the all-out campaign the terrorist organizations anywhere.

The second news item that I wanted to share with you has to do with the instruction that the Israeli delegation to the peace talks with Syria has received today, to go back to Israel. Yesterday, after the second terror act in Jerusalem, the decision was made to postpone the resumption of the second part of the current Wye talks by one day, to mark the sorrow and the sense of grief that all Israelis have.

But after today's outrage in Tel Aviv, it is obvious to us that this is not the context within which an effective peace process can be conducted and that, for now, the Israeli delegation has been instructed to go back to Israel.

Let me put all of this in a somewhat broader context. The recent waves of attacks has affected the very fundamentals of public life in Israel. And the tasks of the Israeli government, as we see them now, are principally three.

First and foremost is to put an effective and immediate end to the present terrorist campaign, and to assure that no more attacks will be conducted successfully against civilians and civilian targets in Israel.

Secondly -- the second objective of government policies is to assure that this will remain the case in the future; that is to say, beyond the immediate campaign and the immediate need to put an end to the current wave lies the longer-term need to provide security to the population of Israel, to all segments of the population in all parts of Israel.

Thirdly, comes the need to prevent an undermining of the peace process. This is one of the objectives of the organizers of the present campaign. And we are determined, once we consolidate the situation and guarantee the basic security of Israelis and every Israeli, would be to make sure that this political aim of undermining the peace process does not succeed.

In conducting the present effort by the Israeli government, we are guided by a number of principles. First and foremost is the duty and ability of the government of Israel to provide security to its population and to conduct an effective campaign against the terrorist organizations and their infrastructure. And let me underline the word "infrastructure". Of course we focus on the individual terrorist who commits the heinous act or who commits the suicide bombing. But we always have to bear in mind that these individuals come from a background, that there is a infrastructure that supports them, that makes the activity possible. And our campaign is directed against the organizations and against the infrastructure.

I said we, the government of Israel and the security forces of Israel, will act as if there was nobody else, as if we alone had the task of providing security to the population of Israel. Having said that, we do not wish to exonerate anybody else who can and should contribute to this campaign. First and foremost, the Palestinian Authority, that has been doing more in recent days; it should do even more than that, and it should be consistent and persistent in pursuing what I have defined so far in Israeli terms, but also in Palestinian terms, is a mortal challenge to that very authority.

Secondly, there has to be a supportive Arab context. This peace process has been conducted with Palestinians and with the Arab world. We have had several Arab partners to this peace process. We hope and expect that these Arab partners to the peace process will lend a hand, an arm and a shoulder to the effort to save that peace process from a deadly attack, offensive, that has been directed against it. There is much that the Palestinian Authority can do, but in order to maximize its ability to do so and to sustain it over time, it needs to have the political, moral and logistical support of the rest of the Arab world, or at least the rest of those parts of the Arab world that are supportive of the peace process.

Finally, we are working hand in hand with the Clinton administration. And the determination of that administration to invest everything that it can in, first and foremost, supporting us, and then in supporting the peace process, is a source of comfort to us, as is the encouragement and support that have been coming from Congress and from all segments of American society. In these difficult days, we know that we are not alone. Thank you very much.

Q: Does this mean, Mr. Ambassador, that Israel is ready to strike at the infrastructure outside of Israel?

AMB. RABINOVICH: I think that we would rather this was not done by us. But if it is not done by those who are there who have the formal responsibility, I think we'll have to look very closely at the possibility of us doing what needs to be done. Yes, please?

Q: Does that mean going to Iran, Mr. Ambassador?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Pardon?

Q: Does that mean striking at Iran?

AMB. RABINOVICH: I think it's premature to get into any details. But I think we focus first and foremost on our immediate environment. Although when I said "infrastructure of terrorism", that infrastructure unfortunately extends also beyond our immediate environment.

Q: What would you like the United States to do specifically?

AMB. RABINOVICH: I think the United States is looking at a number of possibilities. I think that this afternoon the -- there is a consultation that the president is holding, and I'm confident that at the end of that meeting decisions will be made, and they will be announced. And I would let the administration make these announcements. But I am confident that the basic political and technical needs that we may have in waging this very difficult campaign will be assisted by the administration.

Q: What specifically would you like Syria to do? And is it fair to conclude that if Syria had been more forthcoming in its conversations with your delegation over the last few days, condemning the attack and promising to do something with Hamas and other radical groups that are in Damascus, that you wouldn't have called off the (negotiations ?)?

AMB. RABINOVICH: No, I can be very categorical on that latter part of your question. The decision to recall the delegation to Israel is not related to statements made or not made, or to actions taken or not taken by Syria, as I said. It was done against a general background and against the -- well, on the background of a feeling that this is not a fruitful time for engaging in such negotiations. I said this is unrelated to statements that could have been made.

But unrelated to this, we would hope that what was a faint -- one faint theme in the Syrian media last week -- last week the word "condemn," the term "condemn" was used for the first time in this context in the Syrian media -- that this does not remain an isolated theme, but becomes a more explicit and a more persistent denunciation.

Now I do not think that we need to single Syria out. Syria is not a case by itself. Syria is one of the Arab states who participate in the peace process, who negotiate with us, and my call would not be directed specifically at Syria, but at the bloc of Arab states who also have a stake in the status quo.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, I have three questions, if I might.

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yes, please.

Q: What, specifically, do you want the Palestinian Authority to do in its areas to stem those heinous acts of terrorists, knowing that these criminal perpetrators committed these acts on Israeli territory? (Off mike) -- two of them. What do you think of upgrading the joint Israeli-Palestinian security convoys or forces or elements in the area? Last but not least, what do you think -- or when do you think that the closure of the territories will be ended or eased up?

AMB. RABINOVICH: One is, there is a lot that can be done. I think that the security apparatus of the Palestinian Authority has a very good picture of who the leaders are, who the cadres are, who the preachers are who have been brainwashing those demented individuals who have carried out these attacks. They may know where arms caches are, explosives caches are. I think we need to see a day-in, day-out, street-by-street, house-by-house operation designated to root out the infrastructure of these organizations.

Now, you said that these acts were committed on Israeli territory, but somebody left -- a place near Hebron or a place near Gaza, somebody provided that somebody with explosives, some brainwashed the mind of that young man, and the only way in which this can be counteracted is by the -- is by the Palestinian Authority.

Now, we would like to see a greater coordination between us and the Palestinians in the area of security. This is important, but let me emphasize this will not be a substitute for what the Palestinians have to do for themselves. Your third --

Q: When will the closure --

AMB. RABINOVICH: Ah, the closure. I don't think there's a date yet. I think our focus right now is on the prevention of further acts, and any notions or reflections on the lifting of the closure, I think, will have to wait. Yes, please?

Q: You said that on the one hand, you don't want to see -- (inaudible), but you also said before that one of the guiding principles in the anti-terrorism campaign is waging a campaign versus -- (inaudible) -- structure. With part of the Hamas's infrastructure being based in Damascus, how do you reconcile that -- (inaudible)?

AMB. RABINOVICH: To the best of my knowledge, this is not an operational infrastructure. It's a PR operation. This doesn't make us happy, but this is not -- this is not an operational infrastructure. We're not appreciative of the fact that statements are sometimes published in Damascus, but it's not the statements that make the difference. It's the explosives that make the difference.

Q: But you also said that defense -- it's not a question of what Syria says or doesn't say, or what it does or doesn't do. What would you like to see them do about the segment of Hamas that is based there?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Of course, we would have liked Syria to close down whatever office Hamas has and not to allow the publication of Hamas's, or any other terrorist organization's, communiquZs in Damascus. But this is a political issue; it's not an operational issue. We are in negotiations with Syria. The purpose of the negotiations is to make peace between the two countries. For peace to be made between the two countries, trust has to be established between the two countries. The fact that offices exist and operate and statements are published and condemnations are not issued by the government, do not contribute to the establishment of such trust. Yes, please, Matt?

Q: Can there be the resumption of talks with Syria as long as there is no condemnation or statement of -- (inaudible) --

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yes, I --

Q: -- and is Syria a viable partner in the peace process unless the Hamas office is closed and they issue some statement?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yes, I have not -- if you noticed, I have not established any linkage; I have not made any conditions. I was asked specifically whether a condemnation would have delayed the departure of the delegation. I said no, this was not the case. But I did point, just a few minutes ago, to the political linkage, the political impact that the Syrian line on these issues has. So we've been very careful not to -- not to put conditions before negotiations. There negotiations are difficult and complex enough. But honestly -- we have to be honest and explain to the Syrians that failure to respond to what we think is not just our needs but the objective needs of the peace process, is politically unhelpful.

Q: Does Israel have the impression that Hamas itself is divided? On the one hand there was the statement that there would be a three-month suspension of bomb attack, and then comes today's attack. And if this organization is indeed splintered, does that make Israel's job of countering it more difficult?

AMB. RABINOVICH: First of all, it may be the case. And of course the more ideological organizations of this kind tend to splinter over questions of ideology and policy, which makes discipline and dealing with them more difficult. Let me say that I was totally unimpressed by the statement that you refer to. We did not see that as an offering of peace, we did not take it seriously, and I'm glad we did not, because you see what it amounted to. Yes, Sid, please?

Q: Mr. Ambassador, is Israel still of the opinion that Hamas is raising money in the United States?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Is --?

Q: Is Israel still of the opinion that Hamas is raising money legally in the United States?

AMB. RABINOVICH: It's not a question of opinion, it's a question of facts, and I'm afraid they still do. That Hamas became very sophisticated in fund-raising and disguising the true efforts of fundraising, and these are facts, these are not a matter of opinion. Yes, please?

Q: Yes, could I ask about the extent of the threat in the sense that this morning an administration official knowledgeable about terror said off-the- record that -- when he was asked, "Is it true that there are only 200 members of [Iz-a-din-al] Qassem Brigade and Islamic Jihad combined?" And he said, "Why don't you try less than 100." What is Israel's view of that?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Frankly, I don't know what the figures are and I wouldn't want to mislead you by offering any figure. But you know when you're looking at individuals who are willing to blow themselves up with several pounds of explosives, even a hundred is a very large number. Barry?

Q: I was wondering about the process itself, which if I remember correctly with a handshake on the White House lawn, this was described as a trial period, a risky period, a trial period, I mean, give it a chance, see if you could -- for one thing, you gave the PLO control over security in vast areas of the West Bank. You had Israeli troops pull back. Maybe you're surprised that the attacks are in Israel proper instead of against settlers. But as you reflect, do you see any reason to reconsider or to adjust any of the things you've done? Of course -- (off mike) -- the administration -- (off mike) -- the Israelis -- these are the two people who pushed this deal, so it can't expect a lot of self-criticism here.

AMB. RABINOVICH: Mmm-hmm. (In acknowledgment.)

Q: But still I'm wondering -- I mean, you know, as an honest broker, an honest observer, if you would reflect and say whether maybe you made some wrong moves.

AMB. RABINOVICH: I think every complex policy requires the authors of the policy and the individuals in the departments who execute the policy to keep thinking about what they are doing and to assess what they are doing as they go along. Clearly, a challenge along the lines that we have witnessed and a challenge with the degree of severity that we witnessed gives us pause. And the government spent over two hours today in reviewing security questions. These are -- all have a direct bearing on the questions that you raised. And I'm sure that as we are treated to a more detailed version of the government's resolution of today, you will see adjustments in the security area. Yes, please?

Q: You say that you're looking for help from the Palestinian Authority and other supportive groups to, in your words, "root out the infrastructure" of these terrorists. But what is the timetable, or how long will it be before Israel acts on its own?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Israel is acting on its own. Now your question overlaps, to some extent, Barry Schweid's question. The -- it's very important, in dealing with a challenge as severe as the present challenge, not to overreact. And as I said, the -- what we need to do as a government is very clear to us, and these are the priorities: the personal security and the collective security of the citizens of Israel. But there is also a tomorrow, and the longer-range future is in a political settlement. Military and security responses deal with the immediate challenge, as they do not provide an overall solution. The overall solution remains political, and we must not lose sight of that.

Q: (Off mike) -- can I --

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yes?

Q: -- I still don't really understand --

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yes?

Q: -- your explanation -- and you don't want the word "postponed" used; I'm not sure what word you prefer -- for setting aside, perhaps, the Israeli-Syria negotiations. I mean, is it inappropriate because this is a period of mourning? Or is it politically -- I sense that it isn't politically the best time for the Israeli government to make further concessions. You'd like the dust to settle a little bit, maybe the terrorism to recede a little bit into the background, and then you can proceed ahead on the track you're on. What is it that stops you from having these talks? If you say indeed the process must go on, why isn't it going on this afternoon? Or is it just a matter of some mourning period?

AMB. RABINOVICH: You used the term is it inappropriate? I would turn it around and say what is appropriate. The appropriate thing to do was to -- not to negotiate; to indicate that business is not as usual. Now, your second proposition will not stand, or will not hold water in this case because we have not been discussing concessions, we have been discussing with the Syrians the question of security arrangements in the event of an agreement between the two countries. These were presentations of the Syrian concept of security, the Israeli concept of security. And believe me, we could have continued Tuesday and Wednesday to juxtapose these concepts without having made any concessions. So the question of making or not making concessions in this atmosphere is just not a relevant question here. It was the sense of the Israeli government of what was the right thing to do on a day like this, and the decision was that the right thing to do was to recall the Israeli delegation back home.

Q: Mr. Ambassador?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yes, Charlie, please?

Q: You said before that it's a fact that Hamas is still fundraising in the U.S. What have you asked the administration to do specifically beyond the president's order of January of '95 to squeeze that tighter?

AMB. RABINOVICH: I don't think we got into -- I don't think we got into specifics. I think the administration knows what the nature of the problem is, and I think it has the political will to do what is necessary. But as I think the case of Abu Marzouk has indicated, when you have to operate within the confines of the law, sometimes it's difficult. The fact is that the extradition request is subjected to a very long and complex legal review. Yes, please?

Q: On the Wye talks, did you feel that there was real substantive progress being made? And do you feel that those talks, out of the context of this situation, have a future?

AMB. RABINOVICH: There was limited progress in the sense that I think at the end of the last few days of negotiations both we and the Syrians had a better understanding of each other's concepts of security. There was no closing of the gaps. Now, you have to bear in mind that this government has been negotiating with Syria for three and a half years, and it is not this day of negotiations or another day of negotiations that would make the crucial difference. This is -- it's been a very lengthy and difficult negotiations, and we don't measure it by the day or by the week.

STAFF: Okay, thank you very much.

Q: Thank you.

AMB. RABINOVICH: Thank you.